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ESSAY

EXTENDING THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990

Carl Tobias*
Several years ago, I admonished those who are responsible for maintaining a uniform, simple system of federal civil procedure to ameliorate the increasing balkanization of that regime, a problem exacerbated
by the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990. 1 More recently, I
urged Congress to recalibrate the legislation. 2 The CJRA encouraged
unprecedented introspection in all ninety-four federal district courts,
leading to experimentation with procedures that were intended to reduce expense and delay in civil litigation. Despite my cogent suggestions for extending the deadline for the CJRA's implementation, Congress completely ignored that brilliant advice. By some oversight,
Congress not only failed to call me as a witness, but also neglected to
schedule a hearing regarding this matter. 8
I was recently vindicated, however, when Congress passed the Judicial Amendments Act of 1994 and adopted concepts that were central
to my recommendations. I had asserted that the CJRA's major purposes could not be achieved in the time prescribed, threatening the legislation's efficacious implementation, and thus, I proposed that Congress postpone several statutory deadlines.• Congress actually
subscribed to my ideas in the Judicial Amendments Act. A significant
component of the new legislation extends for one year the mid-199 5
date when the RAND Corporation, which is studying ten pilot districts' experimentation with cost and delay reduction procedures, must
submit its conclusions to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 11
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris
Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.]. 1393, 1427 (1992).
2. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 30 HARV. ]. ON
LEGIS. 115, 127-33 (1993).
3. Apologies again to Professor John Hart Ely. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 115 n.2.
4. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 128-32.
5. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4345 (1994).
Section two of the statute extends the authorization of the Judiciary Automation Fund for three
years, while section three extends authorization for court-annexed arbitration in twenty districts
until the end of 1997. See id. §§ 2-3.
105
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Numerous compelling arguments supported congressional postponement of this deadline. Most importantly, the RAND Corporation can
now capture much additional data, which are critical to assessing accurately the procedures' effectiveness in decreasing expense and delay,
thereby increasing the value of the innovative civil justice reform effort.
Particularly significant, the extension will facilitate RAND's collection, evaluation, and synthesis of considerably more information on the
cohort of cases that impose the greatest cost .and delay and, therefore,
enhance understanding of the procedures' efficacy in expeditiously concluding that litigation which is the most difficult to resolve.
In short, the one-year extension of the statutory deadline could substantially increase the worth ·of this novel national experiment with
expense and delay reduction procedures, even though the modification
might seem relatively insignificant. The above factors mean that the
section of the Judicial Amendments Act of 1994 that postpones the
deadline for completing the study of the pilot districts warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that effort. The paper initially explores the
developments that prompted Congress to pass legislation extending the
deadline. I first examine the RAND Corporation's empirical assessment in the ten pilot districts and ascertain that the company's compliance with the mid-1995 date on which it was to have submitted the
study would have precluded assembling, evaluating, and synthesizing
considerable instructive material. The essay concomitantly analyzes the
genesis of this problem and finds that several phenomena, such as some
pilot districts' delayed implementation of civil justice reform, led to the
complication but that RAND had no responsibility for, and was unable to affect, the difficulty.
I next briefly evaluate the 1994 statute's provisions. The paper then
assesses whether Congress should have granted the extension by examining the advantages and disadvantages that will probably attend postponement. I ascertain that the benefits will be much greater than the
detriments, most of which are comparatively unimportant or appear
amenable to amelioration. The essay thus finds that the congressional
decision to extend the deadline was appropriate. I conclude with several suggestions for efficaciously implementing the postponement that
the 1994 Judicial Amendments Act affords.

l.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO PASSAGE OF THE JUDICIAL
AMENDMENTS ACT

A.

CJRA Statutory Requirements

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 required the Judicial Confer-
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ence to select ten pilot districts, at least five of which must encompass
metropolitan areas. 6 The legislation mandated that, not later than December 31, 1991, the pilot districts adopt six statutorily-prescribed
principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay
reduction; the pilot districts were to experiment with those procedures
for three years. 7
The Act commanded that by December 31, 199 5 the Judicial Conference submit a report on the pilot program, including an analysis of
how much the principles and guidelines decreased expense and delay,
to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.8 The legislation required that the Conference consider these
results in light of the effect on cost and delay in ten comparable districts that had discretion to promulgate and apply the principles and
guidelines enumerated in the CJRA. 9 This comparison was to be premised on a study performed by an "independent organization with expertise in the area of federal court management." 10 After soliciting
proposals, the Judicial Conference selected the RAND Corporation,
an entity that possesses substantial multidisciplinary experience in civil
justice research, having conducted numerous evaluations of federal and
state court procedures and operations. 11 The Judicial Conference requested that the RAND Corporation submit the results of its study by
the middle of 1995, so that the Conference would have sufficient time
to prepare its report for Congress. 12
The CJRA provided that the Conference's report recommend
"whether some or all district courts should be required to include" in
their civil justice plans the prescribed six principles and guidelines. 18 If
the Judicial Conference suggests that some or all districts adopt the
procedures, the Conference must initiate Federal Rule revision to implement this recommendation. 14 Were the Judicial Conference to reject
the pilot program's expansion, the Conference must "identify alterna-

6. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
§ 105(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7. See id. § 105(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prescribing
principles and guidelines principally governing case management, discovery and ADR).
8. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(1).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See Memorandum of RAND Corporation, Terry Dunworth & James Kakalik, Summary of Research Design for Evaluation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 ii, 29-30 (March 18, 1994) (on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review)
[hereinafter Summary].
12. See id. at 4; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(A).
14. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(B).
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tive, more effective cost and delay reduction programs that should be
implemented in light of its" report's findings and may commence Federal Rule amendment to effectuate the suggestion. 111
The Judicial Conference delegated most of these statutorily-assigned
responsibilities to the United States Judicial Conference Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management. That Committee's initial chair was Robert Parker, then-Chief Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, and the Committee's present chair is Ann Claire Williams, District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois. 16
Designation of the ten pilot districts was the first action taken by the
Committee that is relevant to the issues treated in this essay. The only
requirement that the CJRA imposed on the Conference was that at
least five of the courts chosen be districts "encompassing metropolitan
areas." 17 The Conference Committee relied on several factors-such as
filing volume, caseload type, and the relative speed with which districts
resolved lawsuits-in selecting the Southern District of California, the
District of Delaware, the Northern District of Georgia, the Southern
District of New York, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, the
Southern District of Texas, the District of Utah, and the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 18
The Conference principally depended on workload per judge, district size, the quantity of civil and criminal filings, and the disposition
time in civil litigation, as elements for comparing pilot and comparison
districts. Furthermore, the Conference consulted recommendations
made by RAND in choosing the ten comparison districts. 19 These are
the District of Arizona, the Central District of California, the Northern District of Florida, the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern
District of Indiana, the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Western
District of Kentucky, the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of
New York, and the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 20

15. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(c)(2)(C).
16. President Clinton recently appointed Judge Parker to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Judicial Milestones, THE THIRD BRANCH, (Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.) Aug. 1994, at 8. Judge Williams became chair of the Committee in
October 1993. See Chief Justice Names Judicial Conference Committee Chairs, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.) Aug. 1993, at 4-5.
17. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 105(b)(2).
18. See Memorandum from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to the Judicial Conference of the United States, Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations
on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 5 Oune, 1994)
(on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review) [hereinafter Preliminary Observations).
19. See id.; see also Summary, supra note 11, at 9-12.
20. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 5.
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The RAND Corporation's Efforts

The RAND Corporation expeditiously and systematically undertook
its study of the pilot program. 21 RAND commenced research in September 1991, and the company concentrated on refining its particular
research design and on assisting the Judicial Conference in designating
the comparison districts during the initial half-year. 22 RAND refined
the survey questionnaires that it planned to send judges, lawyers, and
litigants and prepared to field test the questionnaires throughout this
six-month period and thereafter. 23 RAND researchers also met with
judicial officers and court personnel in each of the twenty pilot and
comparison districts to explain the project and to solicit their
cooperation. 24
Detailed collection of data began in 1992 and was scheduled to continue until December 1994. 211 RAND first chose a stratified random
sample of 250 cases from lawsuits that terminated in each of the
twenty districts in 1991. RAND then selected a similar sample of cases
to which courts applied civil justice reform procedures, beginning with
·
litigation filed during 1992 and 1993.
RAND explained that it was unable to commence this component of
the study earlier because a number of pilot districts had not completely
implemented procedures in civil justice expense and delay reducti<,m
plans until "well into" 1992, even though all of these courts did satisfy
the December 31, 1991 statutory deadline for adopting plans. 26
RAND proffered several reasons for delayed effectuation, and my
work and the research of other observers confirm RAND's
explanations.
Numerous districts decided to include civil justice reform requirements in their local rules, which was an advisable practice because it

21. I rely substantially in this subsection on Preliminary Observations, supra note 18;
Memorandum of RAND Corporation, Terry Dunworth & James Kakalik, Supplemental Detailed Evaluation of Selected ADR Programs in Selected CJRA Pilot and Comparison Districts,
Summary of Research Design (October 16, 1992) (on file with the University of Cincinnati
Law Review) [hereinafter Supplemental], and interviews with RAND and its personnel, employees of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and others familiar with the RAND
effort.
22. See Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4.
23. See id.; see also Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 19-20 (discussing
questionnaires).
24. See Summary, supra note 11, at 14-15.
25. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at
19-21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4.
26. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21 (providing RAND's explanation);
see also Carl Tobias, judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56 (1992)
(listing all pilot districts' satisfaction of the deadline); supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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facilitated the access of lawyers and litigants to applicable procedures. 27 Such inclusion meant that the courts had to publish the proposed procedural changes, solicit and consider public input on the proposals, modify them as indicated, formally promulgate the new or
amended local rules, and notify the bar and the public that the procedures had become effective. 28
A number of districts encountered complications in implementing
new procedural requirements. Illustrative is the "difficulty involved in
instituting a formally structured [Alternative Dispute Resolution]
ADR plan, which requires developing detailed procedures and forms,
selecting and certifying ADR providers and informing and educating
members of the bar about the new program. " 29 Even some courts that
did not experience these types of problems discovered that elaborating
and effectuating the specifics of new procedures and policies consumed
considerably more time than Congress or the federal bench had
contemplated. 30
RAND planned to track the 5,000 cases being treated with CJRA
procedures through final disposition or for as long as the statutorilyimposed deadlines permitted. 31 RAND acknowledged that the median
time for resolving private civil lawsuits has been approximately nine
months, although courts require much longer to dispose of numerous
cases. 32 RAND's assertions that civil justice reform procedures may
substantially reduce cost and delay in those lawsuits that presently
consume the greatest time to process and that probably are most expensive led it to oversample this group of cases and to state that it must

27. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1587, 1623 (1994). See generally David S. Day & Margo R. Tschetter, The Local
Rule Revision Project: The South Dakota Experience, 38 S.D. L. REV. 500 (1993) (examining
the Uniform Local Rule Revision process in the District of South Dakota as an example of
beneficial experimentation).
28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 28. For example, compliance with these procedural requirements meant
that the Montana District's civil justice expense and delay reduction plan only became effective
on April 1, 1992. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal District, 53
MONT. L. REV. 239, 239 n.2, 243-244 (1992).
29. See Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 28. For example, institution of an
ambitious ADR program in the Western District of Missouri consumed considerable time. See
Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335,
341-42 (1993).
30. Quite a few districts also had to expend time employing and training new personnel to
adopt, implement, and evaluate the reform procedures. Indeed, as late as June 1994, RAND
found that there were "even a few circumstances under which some plan provisions have still
not yet been implemented." Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 28.
31. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21.
32. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4.
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collect data for three years. 33 RAND admonished that a "significant
and troublesome proportion of the CJRA case sample will still be open
when, under the present timetable, data collection must end at the
close of 1994." 34
The RAND Corporation's early prognostication proved to be correct. By 1994, it became clear that an important percentage of the
cases that RAND was tracking would not be completed in time to permit their inclusion in the RAND study. The Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, one research and data collection component
of the federal courts that has significant responsibility for helping to
implement and evaluate the CJRA, requested that RAND compile a
report thoroughly explaining this problem. 311
RAND relied upon the districts' histories of resolving litigation over
the last two decades and projected into the future by case types. 36 Were
it to mainta'in the original schedule, RAND found that the average
percentage of lawsuits which would remain unresolved when its study
was scheduled to end would be twenty percent, a number of districts
would have greater than thirty percent, and the loss of some specific
categories of litigation would exceed forty percent. 37 The above percentages were not uniformly distributed either across districts or case
types. 38 It is important to emphasize that many of these suits are the
very ones that require the greatest time and resources to conclude and
on which civil justice reform procedures could have the most profound
effects.
When Judge Williams read the report that the Administrative Office
asked RAND to compile, she found that an extension was clearly warranted and desirable. In the spring of 1994, Judge Williams wrote
Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
the CJRA's principal proponent, suggesting the propriety of postponement. 39 This correspondence, however, elicited no written response,

33. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21; Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4.
RAND asserted that, over the three-year time, experience will probably lead districts to improve and modify policies and that it would be important to reflect those improvements in the
report to Congress. Supplemental, supra note 21, at 4.
34. Preliminary Observations, supra note 18, at 21.
35. This assertion is premised on conversations with RAND personnel, Administrative
Office employees, and other individuals who are knowledgeable about civil justice reform.
36. Telephone Interview with Terence Dunworth, Principal Researcher, RAND Corporation Ouly 11, 1994) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
37. Id.
38. For instance, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which quickly instituted its reform
effort, is projected to have only a three percent loss. Telephone Interview, supra note 36.
39. Letter from Ann Claire Williams, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, to
Senator Joseph Biden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 13, 1994).
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even though the Senator's staff began working on possible solutions." 0
When the Case Management Committee met on June 21, 1994, it officially considered the issue for the first time and unanimously voted to
request that Congress extend the relevant deadlines. 0
The Committee asked Judge Williams to write another letter informing Senator Biden of the Committee's action and requesting him
to sponsor legislation that would extend those deadlines. •2 The necessity for that correspondence was obviated, however, when it became
clear that several prominent members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, including Senator Biden, intended to introduce a bill that would
address this matter during the summer of 1994. •s

II.

GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Several factors apparently explain why so many cases would have
remained unresolved when RAND was scheduled to complete its
study. One important consideration is that the statute initially provided
insufficient time for the litigation in which CJRA procedures were being applied to conclude and for RAND to assemble, analyze, and synthesize all of the relevant data.•• Earlier experimentation with similar
reforms in states, such as California and New Jersey, suggested that
the time prescribed in the 1990 legislation for experimentation with
procedures and for assessment would probably prove inadequate." 11
This was particularly true of the complex suits, which require the
greatest money and time to resolve and for which RAND oversampled,
even though these cases are critical to the most accurate evaluation of
the efficacy of civil justice reform procedures.
Another significant factor was numerous pilot districts' delay in fully
instituting expense and delay reduction procedures for reasons recounted above, such as the need to promulgate new local rules." 6 Some-

40. Telephone Interview with Sean Moylan, Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary
Committee Ouly 11, 1994).
41. This is premised on telephone interviews with several individuals who are familiar
with that meeting.
42. This is premised on telephone interviews with several individuals who are familiar
with that meeting.
43. See S. 2407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also infra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text.
44. Telephone interview, supra note 36; see also TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M.
PACE, RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990); supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
45. This assertion is premised on telephone interviews with numerous individuals who are
knowledgeable about federal and state civil justice reform efforts.
46. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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what slow implementation meant that districts failed to apply procedures immediately upon the adoption of civil justice plans, that RAND
could not begin selecting all relevant suits for tracking on January 1,
1992, that a number of suits designated were filed throughout 1992,
and that some of the litigation chosen was instituted as late as 1993. •7
Delayed effectuation also explains why so many lawsuits would have
terminated after the study's scheduled completion date.
It is clear, however, that RAND had no responsibility for, and could
have done little to affect, the problems that arose. The Judicial Conference selected RAND to conduct the study many months after Congress passed the CJRA, so that RAND obviously did not participate in
the decisionmaking that established the statutory deadlines. RAND
was similarly uninvolved in, and unable to influence, the delays that
pilot districts experienced when implementing civil justice reform.
The RAND Corporation apparently did all that it could to comply
with the legislative deadline. As soon as the Judicial Conference chose
RAND to perform the assessment, the company promptly and effectively instituted the study. Since the evaluation's initiation, RAND
seems to have done all possible to conduct the analysis expeditiously
and effectively.
Ill.

THE JUDICIAL AMENDMENTS ACT

The specific statutory section that provides the extension warrants
relatively limited treatment here because the provision is rather terse
and straightforward and its passage was relatively uncontroversial.
Five members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced the Judicial Amendments Act of 1994 on August 18, while Congress was battling over the crime bill, health care reform, and rushing toward its
Labor Day recess." 8 Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Committee
Chair, Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), Courts Subcommittee Chair,
and Senators Charles Grassley (R-lowa), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), ranking minority members of the Committee,
sponsored the legislation which passed that day and was sent to the
House of Representatives. 49
On October 7, the House enacted the bill as received following political machinations in which prominent members of the House Judiciary
Committee attempted to insert provisions, governing topics such as au-

47. Telephone interview, supra note 36.
48. See S. 2407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12104 (1994).
49. See 140 CoNG. REC. S12104, S12106 (1994) (statement of Senator Grassley); Judicial
Amendments Act of 1994, 140 CONG. REC. Hll,295-96 (1994).
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thorization to build additional federal courthouses, that they favored. 60
At the eleventh hour, common sense apparently prevailed, and Congress passed this measure extending three p~ograms that are important
to the operations of the federal courts. 61
The legislation simply postpones for one year the date on which the
Judicial Conference must report to Congress. This means that RAND
has an additional year in which to complete its study and tender the
results to the Conference. The ten pilot and ten comparison districts,
therefore, must retain and continue applying the six principles and
guidelines for another year, while lawyers and parties litigating in
those courts must continue complying with those requirements. The
twenty districts must also continue working with RAND to facilitate
·
its evaluation of these procedures.
IV.

BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXTENDING THE
STATUTORY DEADLINE

A

Benefits

Many important advantages will accrue from extension of the statutory deadline. Most significant will be the ability to capture considerably more data, which leads to more accurate determinations about precisely how much specific procedures reduce expense or delay and
provides better information on which to base policy decisions regarding
the mechanisms' application. These factors are especially true of the
cases that are most protracted and expensive and of the procedures that
ostensibly have the largest potential to save money or time in those
lawsuits.
Postponing the deadline is apparently preferable for nearly all individuals, interests, and institutions-including Congress and federal
court judges, lawyers, and litigants who have participated in the civil
justice reform enterprise to date and who will be involved in future
efforts to improve federal civil litigation. Practically everyone, including proponents and critics of the Act and its implementation, will
profit from having the maximum available valid data on the principles
and guidelines and their ability to decrease cost and delay.
It would also be wasteful, having devoted such substantial energy,

50. See 140 CoNG. REC. Hll,295, 11,296 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). This information is
premised on conversations with individuals who are familiar with the developments that
transpired.
51. See Judicial Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, 108 Stat. 4345 (1994);
see also supra note 5.
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time, and resources to experimentation thus far, to not capture a significantly greater quantity of, and more accurate, information. Indeed,
one important reason why so much controversy attended the CJRA's
passage was that no one possessed sufficient data on specific procedures
and their effectiveness in limiting expense or delay to justify national
application. The failure to continue experimentation with, and evaluation of, the principles and guidelines for another year risks reverting to
the earlier situation in which inadequate information was available
about the efficacy of particular measures to warrant reliance on them.
Extension of the deadline seems evenhanded in numerous other
ways. It now appears that postponement will simply yield greater data
and more accurate assessments of the specific principles and guidelines.
Insofar as projections can be made, an extension will not prejudice in
any meaningful way the evaluation of procedural efficacy. Moreover,
postponement seems unlikely to have much positive or negative impact
as between Congress and the federal judiciary, as well as on advocates
and opponents of the 1990 legislation and federal court judges, lawyers, and litigants.
Extension will not require that the budget-conscious Congress appropriate additional resources. The only increased cost of RAND's efforts will be a four percent inflationary factor, which the Administrative Office is prepared to absorb out of previously allocated CJRA
funds. 112 Postponing the deadline concomitantly effects few changes in
the scope of the requirements that the statute imposes on federal districts or the work that the courts agreed to do with RAND. Furthermore, extension jeopardizes no congressional prerogatives regarding
civil justice reform. The 1997 date on which the Act is scheduled to
sunset means that the postponement will actually afford Congress
greater time to plan for the receipt of, and to respond in ways that it
deems appropriate to, the RAND study results and the Judicial Conference Report and recommendation. 113
Extension will also provide some ancillary benefits. For example, it
should enable judges, attorneys, and parties to experiment for a longer
period with ostensibly effective procedures. Postponement will correspondingly accord the Judicial Conference an opportunity to become
even better informed about the reform and to prepare for receipt of the
RAND study so that the Conference can tender the most helpful report to Congress. Congress should similarly be able to capitalize on
this additional time to increase legislative appreciation of civil justice

52. Telephone interview, supra note 36.
53. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
§ 103(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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reform experimentation and its evaluation and to plan for the RAND
analysis and the Judicial Conference report. These congressional endeavors will concomitantly facilitate expeditious, careful consideration
of the RAND study and of the Conference report, which assumes peculiar significance in light of the imminent 1997 date on which Congress must decide whether the CJRA will sunset. 114

B.

Disadvantages

The disadvantages that the extension will impose are relatively few
in number and rather inconsequential. Furthermore, most are amenable to amelioration. Some pilot and comparison districts may be inconvenienced by postponement or may even wish to cease experimentation.
For another year, judges in these twenty districts must continue enforcing the principles and guidelines, while lawyers and litigants will have
to find, understand, and comply with the requirements. 1111 Because most
of these procedures apply comparatively early in the pretrial process,
they could have somewhat limited relevance to that cohort of cases
awaiting resolution and evaluation by RAND. Moreover, the extension will effectively preclude the Judicial Conference from recommending experimentation with principles and guidelines in additional
federal districts because the one-year postponement affords insufficient
time to implement the procedures unless Congress extends the date on
which the CJRA sunsets. 116

C.

Resolution

Both the quantity and quality of benefits that will apparently result
from postponement outweigh the disadvantages, most of which can be
remedied or ameliorated. For example, the extension will enhance the
validity of the study's methodology, the evaluation's integrity, the thoroughness of the information gleaned, and the conclusions derived from
those data. Furthermore, the extension will lead to more well-informed
procedural decisionmaking in the future. Congressional passage of the
legislation that postponed the deadline for a year, therefore, was
advisable.

54. The extension contracts to less than a year the time that Congress has to decide
whether the CJRA will sunset. See supra note 53.
55. Because procedures adopted in some of the districts are difficult to locate, comprehend,
and reconcile with the Federal Rules, they can complicate practice, especially for attorneys and
parties who litigate in multiple districts and who may prefer the uniform Federal Rules. See
Tobias, supra note 1, at 1422-27.
56. See supra notes 13-14, 53 and accompanying text.

1995]

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
V.

117

SUGGESTIONS

Recommendations for efficaciously implementing the statutory extension require relatively little examination here, because the provision
for postponement is comparatively straightforward and should be
rather easy to effectuate. The RAND Corporation must capitalize on
the additional year that the extension affords to gather, assess, and
synthesize the maximum possible relevant material on the principles
and guidelines that the pilot and comparison courts are applying.
RAND should continue collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing pertinent data and working with the twenty districts as conscientiously as
the company apparently has to date. 117
The ten pilot and comparison courts and the federal judges in these
districts should keep cooperating with RAND to facilitate its effective
evaluation of the procedures. The courts must also retain and continue
to apply the principles and guidelines while taking advantage of the
extra year to experiment with and refine promising mechanisms for
reducing expense and delay. Lawyers and parties litigating in these
districts should attempt to make the procedures work effectively, even
as they freely criticize measures that fail to yield cost or time savings.
Judges, attorneys, and parties must cooperate with RAND by, for instance, carefully answering any questionnaires regarding the CJRA
that the company circulates to them. 118
The Judicial Conference should employ the year to increase its understanding of reform efforts and to anticipate the submission of the
RAND study, thereby enabling the Conference to compile a report ·for
Congress that will best assist the lawmakers. For example, the Conference may want to formulate alternative procedures should the RAND
analysis eventually indicate that this option is preferable to more federal districts' application of the statutorily-prescribed principles and

57. Any effort to predict what the RAND study will ultimately show is premature and
fraught with difficulty. A number of the federal districts that are not pilot courts have only been
experimenting for less than two years. Moreover, the RAND Corporation is providing the only
rigorous evaluation of procedures applied in the pilot districts and has reached no conclusions
yet. Nevertheless, it is possible to posit very tentative predictions based upon experimentation
and analysis. For instance, substantial reliance can be placed on annual assessments that numerous districts have performed. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF GEORGIA, ANNUAL AsSESSMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE COURT'S DOCKET (1993);
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DoCKET (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1988 & Supp. V 1'993). This
evaluation suggests that some procedures in the broad areas of judicial case management, discovery, and ADR will probably reduce expense and delay. See Tobias, supra note 27, at 1623.
Congress chose to delay similar evaluation of the Demonstration Program that the Federal Judicial Center is conducting. S. 464, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

118

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

guidelines. lie Congress should concomitantly use the extra year to enhance its comprehension of civil justice reform. For instance, Congress
could continue to monitor experimentation and evaluation in preparing
for the receipt of the Judicial Conference report and in responding to
it when determining whether the CJRA should sunset. 60

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 instituted unprecedented selfanalysis in the federal district courts, which led to experimei;itation
with procedures for decreasing cost and delay in civil litigation. Congress wisely decided to extend for a year the comprehensive assessment
of that experimentation, which the RAND Corporation is conducting.
The postponement should enhance the value of experimentation by facilitating the collection, evaluation, and synthesis of greater, more accurate information on these innovative efforts to save money and time.

59. It is more difficult to predict what the Conference will do because its report and recommendation will probably be premised substantially on the results of the RAND study. See
supra note 57. Moreover, the extension has effectively precluded prescription of experimentation
with principles and guidelines in additional districts, unless Congress extends the date on which
the CJRA sunsets. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text.
60. It is even more difficult to predict what Congress will do. Completion of the RAND
study and of the Judicial Conference report and recommendation to Congress premised on that
study must first occur. Prediction is additionally complicated because of the political machinations that may attend congressional decisionmaking on whether the CJRA should sunset. In any
event, Congress should probably exercise caution in reaching this determination. After all, Congress was substantially responsible for the need to postpone the deadline, even though it wisely
decided to grant an extension.

